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NOTE
Dual Standards for the Use of Employee
Benefit Plans in Corporate Takeovers:
ERISA and the Business Judgment Rule
As contests for corporate control have become more frequent,
the techniques for facilitating takeover attempts as well as the
methods for defending against them have become more creative.'
While commentators have debated the propriety of these tech-
niques,2 courts have attempted to solve some of the unique legal
' Block & Miller, The Responsibilities and Obligations of Corporate Directors in
Takeover Contests, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 44, 44 (1983); see, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace
Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984) (creation of employee stock ownership plan (ESOP)
and transfer of stock to it); Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 115-16 (7th Cir. 1984) (employee
benefit plan used to purchase stock in target companies); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,
669 F.2d 366, 367 (6th Cir. 1981) (grant of lock-up options), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982
(1982); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 289 (3d Cir. 1980) (target company placed block
of shares in friendly hands), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 625 (D. Mo. 1982) ("pac-man defense" employed); Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (use of
"scorched-earth defense"); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1064 (Del. Ch.
1985) (adoption of "poison pill preferred" plan). For discussions of the various defenses to
undesirable takeovers, see generally E. ARANow, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS
IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 193-206 (1977); 1 A. FLEISCHER, JR., TENDER
OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING 291-387 (1983); 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER,
TAKEOVERS AND FRaEzEouTs 263-325 (1978). For an overview of the terminology used in
takeovers, see L. Loss, FuNDAMENTALs OF SEcurrm-s REGULATION 569-71 & 44-45 Supp.
(1983 & Supp. 1984).
2 Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Re-
sponding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Easterbrook
& Fischel, The Proper Role] and Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics,
and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Easterbrook &
Fischel, Takeover Bids] with Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors' Re-
sponsibilities-An Update, 40 Bus. LAW. 1403 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Lipton & Brown-
stein, Takeover Responses] and Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus.
LAW. 101 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Lipton, Takeover Bids] and Lipton, Takeover Bids in
the Target's Boardroom: An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Lipton, Update] and Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Re-
sponse to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Lipton, Response]. Easterbrook and Fischel argue that tactics designed to prevent
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problems they create.' Innovative uses of employee benefit plans
(EBPs)4 in corporate takeovers have contributed considerably to
litigation in the area.5 A target company can create an EBP and
then transfer its own stock to the plan to defend against a hostile
takeover.6 An existing EBP can play an important role as a reser-
tender offers will adversely affect shareholder welfare, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover
Bids, supra, at 1741-43, and, therefore, managers of target companies should acquiesce
when confronted by a tender offer, see id. at 1750; Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role,
supra, at 1201-04. The Easterbrook-Fischel approach has been dubbed the "pure passivity"
theory. See Harrington, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It: The Legal Propriety of Defenses
Against Hostile Takeover Bids, 34 SYRACUSE L. REv. 977, 978 (1983). At the opposite pole,
Lipton contends that management should have broad discretion 'to employ defensive tactics
during a takeover attempt, limited only by the business judgment rule. See Lipton &
Brownstein, Takeover Responses, supra, at 1404; Lipton, Takeover Bids, supra, at 124, 130-
31; Lipton, Update, supra, at 1017; Lipton, Response, supra, at 1231-35. Other commenta-
tors have taken positions between these two extremes. See, e.g., Bebchuck, The Case for
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1028, 1054 (1982) (target manage-
ment should be assigned "auctioneering role" of expanding number of offers before share-
holders); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tac-
tics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 865-75 (1981) (target management should serve
as information provider and as scout for more beneficial offers from "white knights"); Har-
rington, supra, at 1020-27 (business judgment rule should apply to defensive tactics only
where disinterested directors involved; otherwise, management has burden to prove inherent
fairness of transaction by clear and convincing evidence). The courts have followed the Lip-
ton approach. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 269 (2d Cir. 1984) (directors
enjoined from voting stock owned by wholly-owned subsidiary and ESOP); Leigh v. Engle,
727 F.2d 113, 140 (7th Cir. 1984) (investments by trust administrators violated ERISA since
not made solely in interests of plan fiduciaries); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d
366, 374 (6th Cir. 1981) (lock-up options violated prohibition of § 14(e) against "manipula-
tive acts or practices"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490
A.2d 1059, 1077-83 (Del. Ch. 1985) ("poison pill preferred" plan upheld under Delaware
law).
, An employee benefit plan is defined as "an employee welfare benefit plan or an em-
ployee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an
employee pension benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1982). The term embraces plans that
provide medical, disability, unemployment, and similar benefits, as well as plans that pro-
vide retirement income or deferred income to employees. See id. § 1002(1)-(2). Almost all
employee benefit plans are covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982). See 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1982).
5 See infra notes 6-9.
6 See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984) (ESOP
created to concentrate voting control in hands of directors of target); Klaus v. Hi-Shear
Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 228-33 (9th Cir. 1975) (employee stock ownership trust (ESOT) created
to dilute voting strength of minority shareholder attempting to gain control); Herald Co. v.
Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1094-97 (10th Cir. 1972) (employee stock trust plan prevented mi-
nority stockholder from gaining control of newspaper); McPhail v. L.S. Starrett Co., 257
F.2d 388, 389, 394-95 (1st Cir. 1958) (minority stockholder sought to enjoin corporation from
inplementing ESOP since it diluted his voting power). Employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs) have become particularly important tools for defending against hostile takeover
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voir of employer stock,7 or as a friendly purchaser of additional
stock.8 EBPs can also be used to purchase stock in other corpora-
tions, and therefore, can serve as offensive tools in takeovers.9
Employee benefit plans are governed by the provisions of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, (ERISA or the
Act),10 a comprehensive remedial statute designed to protect pen-
sions and other employee benefits.11 One of the primary objectives
of ERISA is the establishment of standards of fiduciary responsi-
bility for persons who "control" such plans. 2 To this end, the stat-
attempts. See C. SCHARF, GUms TO EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS 88 (1976); Siegel,
Problems Inherent in the ESOP Concept, in EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHM PLANS: PROBLEMS
AND PoTENTIALs 80 (1978); Blumstein, New Role for Employee Plans: Warding Off Take-
overs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1985, at D1, col. 3. An employee stock ownership plan is defined
as an individual account
stock bonus plan which is qualified, or a stock bonus plan and money purchase
both of which are qualified, under section 401 of Title 26, and which is designed to
invest primarily in qualifying employee securities and... which meets such other
requirements as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe by regulation.
ERISA § 407(d) (6), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6) (1982). For a description of the steps necessary to
create an ESOP, see Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1459 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 3533 (1984) and Carlson, ESOP and Universal Capitalism, 31 TAx L.
REv. 289, 293-94 (1976).
Profusek & Leavitt, Dealing with Employee Benefit Plans, 18 MERGERS & AcQUIsi-
TiONS 44, 44 (Winter 1984); see, e.g., Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 264 (2d Cir.)
(Grumman Corporation pension plan declined to tender its shares of Grumman common
stock during tender offer), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
8 See, e.g., Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 264 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1069 (1982); District 65, UAW v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1468, 1472-
74 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Issuance of employer stock to an EBP averts a takeover by diluting the
voting strength of the stock held by the raider and by increasing the amount of stock neces-
sary to obtain voting control. See Note, Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Corporate
Takeovers: Restraints on the Use of ESOPs by Corporate Officers and Directors to Avert
Hostile Takeovers, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 731, 734 (1983). The purchase of employer stock
by an employee benefit plan during a hostile takeover attempt may be extremely difficult
for plan trustees to justify. See, e.g., Bierwirth, 680 F.2d at 271; infra notes 27-34 and ac-
companying text.
9 See, e.g., Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 116 (7th Cir. 1984) (approximately 30% of
trust assets invested in other companies, allegedly to aid fiduciaries either to obtain control
or earn substantial "control premiums"); R FR SCH, ESOP FOR THE 80'S 87-89; C. SCHARF,
supra note 6, at 79-84. Acquisitions made with ESOPs allow the employer to employ before-
tax dollars. See R. FfuScH, supra, at 87-89; C. SCHARF, supra note 6, at 79-84; see also Siegel,
supra note 6, at 80 (recognizing ESOP as "vehicle for effectuating a tender offer"); infra
notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
10 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
11 Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 457 (10th Cir. 1978); Donovan v. Daugherty, 550 F.
Supp. 390, 403 (S.D. Ala. 1982); Corley v. Hecht Co., 530 F. Supp. 1155, 1160 (D.D.C. 1982);
M & R Investment Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 484 F. Supp. 1041, 1054 (D. Nev. 1980), aff'd, 685
F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1982).
12 See Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1463 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
1985]
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ute provides "a comprehensive scheme of both general and specific
provisions regulating the conduct of fiduciaries.' 3 In addition, it
creates an express cause of action against a fiduciary for a breach
of statutory standards. 4 Standing to sue under the Act, however, is
expressly limited to the Secretary of Labor and plan participants,
beneficiaries, or fiduciaries.15 Therefore, a bidder whose offer is
frustrated by a fiduciary's defensive action involving EBP re-
sources must either persuade a party with standing under ERISA
to bring suit,'" or seek an alternate remedy under state law.'
7
This Note will discuss the fiduciary standards governing the
use of EBPs in corporate takeover attempts. By examining several
recent decisions, the Note will also attempt to delineate guidelines
for the proper use of EBPs in corporate takeovers when either
ERISA or state law would apply.
FIDUCIARY DUTIES UNDER ERISA
The legislative history of ERISA indicates a congressional in-
tent to impose upon fiduciaries a duty of care and a duty of loyalty
similar to, but stricter than, that which is imposed upon fiduciaries
by the common law of trusts. 8 Section 404(a) of ERISA requires a
fiduciary to discharge his duties "with the care, skill, prudence,
and diligence" that a prudent fiduciary would employ, "solely in
S. Ct. 3533 (1984); ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982). Congress declared the policy of
the Act to be:
to protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee bene-
fit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to par-
ticipants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto,
by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries
of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions,
and ready access to the Federal courts.
ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982).
"3 Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1463 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
3533 (1984); see ERISA §§ 404 & 406, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104 & 1106 (1982); infra note 20.
14 See ERISA 8 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1982).
15 See ERISA 8 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1982); see also Pitt & Miles, The Use of
Corporate Benefit Plans in Hostile Takeovers, in NEw TECHNIQUES IN ACQUISITIONS &
TAKEOVERS 556-57 (1983) ("courts uniformly have refused to grant standing under Section
502(a) to persons who fall outside [the] enumerated classes").
" See Pitt & Miles, supra note 15, at 558.
17 See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
'8 Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1464 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
3533 (1984); see H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4639, 4649-51 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 533]; S. REP. No. 127, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4838, 4865-66 [hereinafter
cited as S. REP. No. 127].
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the interest of the participants and beneficiaries," for the "exclu-
sive" purposes of providing the specified benefits and defraying
reasonable administration expenses.19 Section 406 supplements the
general provisions of section 404(a) by expressly prohibiting cer-
tain transactions that offer a high potential for loss or misuse of
plan assets.20 Section 406 subsection (a) is directed at transactions
involving parties in interest, while subsection (b) addresses the
problem of fiduciary self-dealing.21
An exception to section 406's literal prohibition against self-
dealing and conflicts of interest is found in section 408(c)(3), which
provides that section 406 shall not be construed to prohibit any
fiduciary from also serving as an officer, employee, agent, or other
representative of a party in interest.22 An officer or director of a
19 ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
'0 See ERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1982). Section 406 reads in pertinent part:.
(a) Except as provided in section 1108 of this title:
(1) A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the plan to engage in a
transaction, if he knows or should know that such transaction constitutes a direct
or indirect-
(D) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a party in interest, of any
assets of the plan;...
(b) A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not-
(1) deal with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for his own account,
(2) in his individual or in any other capacity act in any transaction involving
the plan on behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose interests are adverse to
the interests of the plan or the interests of its participants or beneficiaries .
Id.
Congress intended § 406 to be a per se prohibition against enumerated transactions. See
Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 1979); McDougall v. Donovan, 552 F. Supp.
1206, 1215 (N.D. Ill. 1982). The existence of a violation of one of the provisions does not
depend on whether any harm results from the transaction. See McDougall, 552 F. Supp. at
1215; Marshall v. Kelly, 465 F. Supp. 341, 354 (W.D. Okla. 1978). In the complex setting of
EBPs, such bright-line rules are advantageous because they assure protection of benefi-
ciaries and provide clear notice of responsibility to fiduciaries. See Donovan v. Cunningham,
716 F.2d 1455, 1465 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3533 (1984).
22 See Donovan v. Daugherty, 550 F. Supp. 390, 403 (S.D. Ala. 1982); ERISA § 406, 29
U.S.C. § 1106 (1982); supra note 20.
22 ERISA § 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (1982); see also Donovan v. Cunningham,
716 F.2d 1455, 1466 (5th Cir. 1983) ("in ERISA Congress departed from the absolute com-
mon law rule against fiduciaries' dual loyalties"), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3533 (1984); Dono-
van v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) ("ERISA contemplates the exis-
tence and approval, in certain circumstances, of fiduciaries acting on behalf of a pension
plan even though they have dual loyalties"), modified on other grounds, 680 F.2d 263 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982); HR. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 312,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5092 (statute "makes it clear" that
party-in-interest may serve as fiduciary in addition to being officer or other representative
of party-in-interest).
1985]
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company, therefore, can properly serve as a trustee to the com-
pany's EBP, as long as he complies with the fiduciary standards of
section 404 and does not engage in transactions prohibited by sec-
tion 406.23
Any purchase of employer securities by an EBP can be viewed
as a direct or indirect use of plan assets for the benefit of the em-
ployer-a party in interest.2 4 In recognition of the "symbiotic rela-
tionship" between an employer and its EBP, Congress specifically
provided that most plans may hold up to ten percent of fund as-
sets in employer-issued securities as long as the acquisition is for
"adequate consideration. '25 However, the payment of adequate
consideration does not, by itself, insulate the trustee from the fidu-
ciary requirements of section 404.2
The leading case involving the application of ERISA fiduciary
standards to the use of EBPs in corporate takeovers is Donovan v.
Bierwirth.17 In Bierwirth, corporate officers serving as trustees of
the Grumman Corporation Pension Plan declined to tender the
plan's stock holdings to tender offeror LTV Corporation, and in-
23 See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 468-69 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (Congress in-
tended fiduciaries with dual loyalties to comply with §§ 404 & 406), modified on other
grounds, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982); S. REP. No. 127, supra
note 18, at 4867 ("even with respect to transactions expressly allowed [by § 408], the fiduci-
ary's conduct must be consistent with the prudent man standard").
24 See Note, The Duties of Employee Benefit Plan Trustees Under ERISA in Hostile
Tender Offers, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1692, 1700 (1982). In the normal course of business, a
purchase of securities by a plan helps the employer by maintaining a ready market for em-
ployer securities. Id. at 1700 & n.37. This discourages tender offers because it allows the
price to be maintained at a level high enough to render a premium offer less feasible. Id.
The market created by a plan also reduces the cost of capital for the corporation. Id. In the
wake of a tender offer, the purchase of employer stock by a plan may play a critical role in
frustrating the offer. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
25 Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir.) (quoting Private Pension Plan
Reform: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Finance, 93 Cong., 1st Sess. 446 (1973)
(statement of Department of Labor)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982); see ERISA §
407(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1982) (percentage limitation); ERISA § 408(e), 29 U.S.C. §
1108(e) (requirement of adequate consideration).
Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) are exempt from the ten percent limitation
of § 407(a) of the Act and may hold all fund assets in the form of employer-issued securities.
ERISA § 407(d)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(3)(B) (1982); see Pitt & Miles, supra note 15, at
528-29.
26 See, e.g., Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467-68 (5th Cir. 1983) (fiduciaries
remain subject to § 404 duties even though consideration paid); S. REP. No. 127, supra note
18, at 4867, (even with respect to transactions expressly allowed, fiduciary's conduct must be
consistent with prudent-man standard).
27 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
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stead purchased additional stock for the plan.28 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court order en-
joining the trustees from taking any action with respect to the
pension plan.29 The court rejected the Secretary of Labor's conten-
tion that the trustees had violated section 406(b) of ERISA, con-
cluding that the acts in question did not constitute "a transaction
between the plan and a party having an adverse interest. 3 0 Never-
theless, the court held that the trustees had failed to satisfy their
duty of prudence in deciding not to sell the stock, 3  and had cre-
ated a no-win situation for their beneficiaries by purchasing addi-
tional shares.32 While expressing doubt as to whether a director-
28 See id. at 264, 268-69. After deciding not to tender the 525,000 Grumman shares held
by the plan, the trustees purchased an additional 1,158,000 shares of stock in Grumman, id.
at 264, an amount just short of the maximum number of employer shares it was permitted
to hold by ERISA, id. at 269; see ERISA § 407(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2) (1982) (prohib-
iting EBPs from holding employer stock, fair market value of which exceeds 10% of fair
market value of assets of plan).
29 See Bierwirth, 680 F.2d at 277. In addition to granting the preliminary injunction,
the district court directed the appointment of a receiver to serve as an investment manager
for the Grumman stock held by the plan. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 476
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), afl'd, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982). The Sec-
ond Circuit, however, struck that part of the order providing for a receiver, see 680 F.2d at
277, determining that the preliminary injunction was adequate protection, see id. at 276.
Reasoning that the trustees could neither tender nor refuse to tender the stock under the
injunction, the court concluded that the appointment of a receiver was unnecessary. See id.
at 277.
30 680 F.2d at 270. The court summarily concluded that the only specific prohibition
that was "arguably applicable" was § 406(b)(2), which prohibits a fiduciary from acting in a
transaction involving the plan on behalf of a party whose interests are adverse to the inter-
est of the plan or of its participants or beneficiaries. See id. Concluding that § 406(b)(2) did
not apply, the court stated that there was "no reason to think Congress intended the expan-
sive interpretation of the various specific prohibitions of § 406 urged by the Secretary, par-
ticularly in light of the inclusion of the sweeping requirements of prudence and loyalty con-
tained in § 404." Id. However, the court further determined that the trustees had violated
the fiduciary duties of § 404. See id. at 276; infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
31 See 680 F.2d at 272. The Bierwirth court noted that the Grumman trustees, all of
whom were officers of Grumman, see id. at 267, failed to consult independent counsel, id. at
272, failed to do a thorough job in determining the potential danger to the Grumman pen-
sion fund, see id. at 273, and failed to consider alternative protective action in the event
that the acquisition by LTV was successful, id. at 273-74. In a later proceeding, the court
held that the losses suffered by the plan should not be determined strictly by comparing the
sale and purchase prices of the stock. See Donovan v. Bierworth, 754 F.2d 1049, 1054 (2d
Cir 1985). Noting that the fund actually earned a net average profit of $11.41 a share, Judge
Pierce wrote that "the measure of loss applicable under ERISA section 409 requires a com-
parison of what the Plan actually earned on the Grumman investment with what the Plan
would have earned had the funds been available for other Plan purposes." Id. at 1056.
2 See 680 F.2d at 275. According to the Bierwirth court, if the LTV tender offer suc-
ceeded, the plan would be left in the undesirable position of a minority stockholder, and if
1985]
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trustee could ever act impartially in the face of a hostile takeover
attempt,3" the court declined to require the resignation of all of-
ficer-trustees in such situations.3 4
At least one commentator has argued, however, that the
purchase of employer stock by an EBP during a hostile takeover
attempt constitutes a per se violation under section 406 of ERISA
when the trustees of the plan are also corporate officers.3 5 It does
not appear that this analysis has yet been adopted by any court
with regard to the defensive use of an EBP. Recently, however, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Leigh v. Engles6 held
that trustees who used the assets of an employee profit-sharing
trust to purchase stock in companies targeted for potential control
contests violated the prohibited transactions and fiduciary stan-
dards sections of ERISA3 7
In Leigh, approximately thirty percent of the plan's assets
were used to purchase stock in three outside companies to help a
control group of officer-fiduciaries gain leverage within the compa-
nies.3 8 Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Cudahy determined
that the prohibited transactions rules of ERISA should be read
broadly in light of Congress' concern with the protection of plan
the tender offer failed, the stock was almost certain to decrease in value. See id.
3 See id. at 272 (it was "almost impossible to see how [the director-trustees] . . could
have voted to tender or even to sell the Plan's stock").
' See id. The Bierwirth court noted that there was "much to be said" for the Secre-
tary's arguments that the trustees' participation in defensive activities "precluded their ex-
ercising the detached judgment required of them as trustees of the Plan," and that the only
proper course for the trustees was to resign immediately so that a neutral trustee could be
appointed for the duration of the tender offer. See id. at 271-72. However, upon finding
specific instances of the trustees' failure to observe the high standard of duty placed upon
them by § 404(a), id. at 276, the court stated that it need not decide whether an officer-
trustee could ever make the careful and impartial investigation necessary to meet the statu-
tory standards, see id.
3 See Note, supra note 24, at 1702-06 (ERISA § 406(b)(2) should be interpreted to
preclude purchase of employer stock during tender offer by trustees who are also directors
of target company).
36 727 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1984).
3" See id. at 132. The Leigh court's holding was based upon alternative grounds: that
the trustees had violated § 404 of ERISA as well as §§ 406(a)(1)(D) and 406(b)(1). See id.
38 See id. at 116. Investments in one company, Berkeley, were allegedly made to pre-
vent the defendants from being "'locked in"' as minority shareholders under hostile man-
agement. Id. at 119. Investments in a second company, OSI, were made to aid defendants in
their struggle to replace the company's existing management, id. at 120, and a third set of
investments were made to assist the defendants in gaining control of the Hickory Furniture
Company, id. at 121.
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beneficiaries.3 9 The court found that the trustees had possessed
"divided loyalties with clear potential for conflicts of interests,"
had failed to seek "independent, disinterested advice" concerning
the plan investments, and had used the trust assets throughout the
control contests in a manner that "dovetailed at all times with the
interests of the [control] group."'40 Notwithstanding this determi-
nation, the court emphasized that it was not "per se impermissi-
ble" for plan trustees to invest in companies involved in control
contests or to align with one side during a takeover battle.41 Simi-
larly, potential conflicts of interest were not deemed "per se imper-
missible" by the court.42
Thus, a careful reading of Leigh reveals that it is largely in
accord with the Second Circuit's decision in Bierwirth.4 Although
it gave a more expansive construction to the prohibited transac-
tions rules," the Leigh court applied an overall review similar to
9 See id. at 126; accord Gilliam v. Edwards, 492 F. Supp. 1255, 1261 (D.N.J. 1980)
("[to fulfill its curative aim, ERISA should be given a liberal construction ...
40 727 F.2d at 132.
41 Id. at 132 n.29. The Leigh court noted that the independence of the trustees was the
primary issue. See id. The congruence between the investments of the plan and those of the
control group was cited as one factor to be considered in reviewing the fiduciaries' loyalty,
along with any conflicts of interest and the independence of the investments. See id. Signifi-
cantly, however, the court stated that "congruence alone would not demonstrate a breach of
that duty of loyalty." Id.
42 See id. at 132 n.31. The court noted that it did not have to reach the question of
whether the potential conflicts of interest were per se impermissible because the other
breaches of fiduciary duty were severe enough by themselves to violate the statute. See id.
The court explicitly refused, however, to reject the per se standard. See id.
"See infra notes 44 & 45 and accompanying text.
, See 727 F.2d at 126-27. The Leigh court noted:
We do not believe that Congress intended the language "use by or for the
benefit of, a party in interest," and "deal . . . in his own interest," to be inter-
preted narrowly. The entire statutory scheme of ERISA demonstrates Congress'
overriding concern with the protection of plan beneficiaries, and we would be re-
luctant to construe narrowly any protective provisions of the Act.
Id. at 126 (citations omitted).
The court stated that § 406(a)(1)(D) "should be read to cover the actions of a trustee
who buys shares in a target corporation in order to assist either the target's management or
the raider in its quest for corporate control or a 'control premium.'" Id. Giving an equally
broad construction to § 406(b)(1), the court construed a trustee's "own interest" to reach
non-financial interests, citing concern with retaining one's own position and maintaining
good relations with one's superiors as illustrations. See id. at 127. It is suggested that such
constructions are inconsistent with the position taken by the Bierwirth court. In Bierwirth,
the court concluded that there was "no reason to think Congress intended the expansive
interpretation . . . of § 406 urged by the Secretary [of Labor]." 680 F.2d at 270; see supra
note 30. However, the Secretary had argued that § 406(b) is "'designed to disqualify fiduci-
aries from even acting in a transaction when they have interests which may conflict with the
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that in Bierwirth in determining whether the fiduciaries had
breached their duties.4 5 It is submitted that the Bierwirth court's
reading of section 406 may have been more restricted because of
the symbiotic relationship that existed between Grumman and the
EBP; such a relationship was not in evidence between the plan and
the outside companies in Leigh.
In recognition of the special relationship that exists between
an employer and its plan, Congress expressly permits an EBP to
purchase employer stock 46 and allows an officer to serve as trus-
tee.47 Since acquisition of employer securities during a hostile take-
over attempt may be in the best interest of the employee benefit
plan, it is submitted that such an acquisition should not be per se
prohibited merely because it may incidentally help the target com-
pany defend against the takeover or assist the officer-trustees in
retaining their positions.48
interests of the plan for which they act.'" Pitt & Miles, supra note 15, at 572-73 (quoting
Brief for Department of Labor at 21 n.8, Donovan v. Bierwith, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982)). The Secretary of Labor urged that the trustees committed a
per se violation of § 406(b) "by acting on behalf of the Plan when they had dual loyalties."
Id. It is submitted that such an interpretation of the section would have been rejected by
the Leigh court as well. Cf. supra notes 41 & 42 and accompanying text. However, by dis-
missing the Secretary's contentions, the Bierwirth court summarily dismissed all considera-
tions of § 406(b). See supra note 30. But cf. supra note 33 (Bierwirth court noted difficulty
Grumman director-trustees would have in selling plan's stock).
'5 See 727 F.2d at 128. Applying the criteria set forth in Bierwirth, the Seventh Circuit
attempted to ascertain whether the plan administrators had acted with an "'eye single to
the interests of the participants and beneficiaries.'" See id. (quoting Bierwirth, 680 F.2d at
271). Moreover, the court considered whether the trustees had undertaken any independent
investigation or had sought independent advice. See 727 F.2d at 129. Indeed, the Seventh
Circuit endorsed, as "the preferred course of action," the Secretary's suggestion that an
officer-trustee of a plan holding or acquiring stock of a target resign in favor of a neutral
trustee. Id. at 132; see supra notes 33 & 34 and accompanying text (similar analysis by the
Bierwirth court).
4" See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
47 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
'8 See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069
(1982). The Bierwirth court noted that:
[a]lthough officers of a corporation who are trustees of its pension plan do not
violate their duties as trustees by taking action which, after careful and impartial
investigation, they reasonably conclude best to promote the interests of partici-
pants and beneficiaries simply because it incidentally benefits the corporation or,
indeed, themselves, their decisions must be made with an eye single to the inter-
ests of the participants and beneficiaries.
Id. at 271; see also G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 543 (2d ed. 1978).
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Although the trustees in Bierwirth claimed that the purchase of
employer stock was largely motivated by concern for the welfare of
the fund in the event LTV gained control," they failed to convince
the court that they had thoroughly weighed the risks to the fund
presented by the stock purchase with the risks potentially arising
from a successful takeover.50 However, it is possible that the trust-
ees could have decided that such an investment was in the best
interests of the plan beneficiaries after a thorough investigation
and careful consultation with independent counsel.51 Since the fi-
duciary guidelines of section 404 adequately protect plan partici-
pants and beneficiaries if a purchase is not in their best interests,
it is submitted that section 406, the prohibited transaction section
of ERISA, should not be interpreted to preclude the purchase of
employer-issued securities by an EBP during a takeover attempt
solely because the plan's trustees are also directors or officers of
the target employer company. However, because loyalty to the
fund is the only loyalty that may affect one's judgment when act-
ing on behalf of the plan,52 a trustee should thoroughly investigate
all alternatives to the purchase and carefully consider the advice of
qualified experts who are independent of the takeover attempt.53
41 See 680 F.2d at 267-68, 274, 276 & n.17. The Grumman trustees in Bierwirth were
concerned that the plan could be merged with one of LTV's underfunded plans or that the
financial condition of LTV might preclude favorable treatment for the plan. See id. at 276
n.17.
80 See id. at 274, 276. The Bierwirth court emphasized the trustees' failure to seek the
advice of independent counsel, see id. at 272, their failure to ascertain thoroughly the facts
with respect to the LTV pension funds, see id. at 273, and their cavalier treatment of state-
ments by LTV that it did not intend to touch the plan, see id. at 274. The court noted that
assurances could not provide protection against the potential financial difficulties of LTV,
but suggested that the trustees should have investigated the degree of protection LTV was
willing to guarantee formally. See id.
"1 See id. at 274, 276. The unfunded liabilities of the LTV plans in question in
Bierwirth were much greater than the trustees had suspected. See id. at 273-74.
It is submitted that because of the symbiotic relationship between a company and its
EBP, the plan trustees must be concerned with the financial well-being of a tender offeror,
as well as with its intentions with respect to the plan. Undoubtedly, a pension plan with
surplus assets might encourage a takeover attempt by a raider seeking to cancel the plan
and recapture the surplus or to merge the plan with an underfunded pension plan of its
own. Cf. Walsh v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 726 F.2d 956, 959 (3d Cir. 1983) (concern that
excess assets in plan fund were alluring to corporate raiders who might obtain control and
syphon off funds or merge plan with one of their own less generously funded pension plans).
52 Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), modified on other
grounds, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
13 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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Because the provisions of ERISA may be enforced only by the
Secretary of Labor or by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary of
an employee benefit plan,54 it is submitted that during an attempt
to defend against a hostile takeover, the creation of such a plan
may escape the scrutiny to which existing EBPs are subjected.55 In
a hostile takeover attempt, the bidder has no standing under
ERISA to bring an action against the parties responsible for the
creation of the plan.56 Moreover, it is suggested that participants
and beneficiaries are unlikely to bring an action challenging the
adoption of a plan which, regardless of the reasons for its creation,
is likely to benefit them. Motivated, perhaps, by a similar desire to
benefit employee interests, the Secretary of Labor apparently has
failed to question the creation of an EBP in the corporate takeover
context. Challenges to such plans, therefore, are initiated by the
party seeking to obtain control of the employer company, and are
based upon state common law fiduciary principles. 57
The fiduciary principles of state common law impose upon
corporate directors a duty of care and a duty of loyalty.58 In most
jurisdictions, a director's standard of care is measured in terms of
the business judgment rule, which protects good-faith actions
taken through the exercise of honest judgment for the legitimate
furtherance of corporate purposes. 59 Due to the presumption of
54 ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1982); see supra note 15 and accompanying
text.
55 See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
56 See LTV Corp. v. Grumman Corp., 526 F. Supp. 106, 108 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1981);
ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982); cf. Condec Corp. v. Farley, 573 F. Supp. 1382,
1387 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (purchaser of substantial amount of stock not appropriate spokesman
for plan beneficiaries).
17 Cf. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (absent statu-
tory authority, court must look to state common law).
5 See id. at 264. The duties of care and loyalty require corporate fiduciaries to exercise
the care that a reasonably prudent person in a similar position would use under similar
circumstances. See id.; Siegel, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: A Proposal for Reform, 36
HASTINGS L.J. 377, 379 (1985).
'9 See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L REP.
(CCH) 1 98,375, at 98,284 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393
N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979); Fairchild v. Bank of Am., 192 Cal. App. 2d
252, 256, 13 Cal. Rptr. 491, 493 (1961); cf. Harrington, supra note 2, at 990 (general response
of courts has been "to abdicate responsibility" for having to judge prudence of corporate
actions). Directors are protected from liability for good faith errors in judgment if they ful-
fill their fiduciary duties. See Siegel, supra note 58, at 380; accord Norlin Corp. v. Rooney,
Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,
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prudence afforded by the business judgment rule,60 fiduciaries bear
a much less stringent burden of proof under common law than
under ERISA, which requires EBP fiduciaries to prove that their
actions were undertaken "with the care, skill, prudence, and dili-
gence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use
* . "1 As a result, it is submitted that an anomalous situation
exists: a corporate fiduciary who causes an EBP to be created and
to be issued shares to defend against a takeover may be protected
by the business judgment rule, while a fiduciary to an existing
EBP under the same circumstances may be precluded by ERISA
from causing the plan to purchase employer-issued shares.
Generally, courts have held that the business judgment rule
governs fiduciaries only when they are shown to lack a self-interest
in the transaction at issue.6 2 Once prima facie proof of self-interest
is shown, the burden of proving that the transaction was fair and
reasonable shifts to the board of directors.63
629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979)).
One commentator has identified three justifications that traditionally have been offered
as support for the business judgment rule:
First, the rule allows directors the freedom to formulate effective corporate policy.
Second, the rule encourages competent people to become directors by alleviating
their fear of personal liability for honest mistakes in judgment. Third, the rule
relieves courts of the burden of second-guessing complex corporate decisions, a
task for which courts often lack the necessary expertise, information, and time.
Siegel, supra note 58, at 380.
co See, e.g., Morrissey v. Curran, 650 F.2d 1267, 1274 (2d Cir. 1981) (business judgment
rule presumes reasonableness of fiduciary's decision); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d
357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) ("directors are presumed to have acted properly and in good faith");
Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980) (corporate directors "are presumed
to exercise their business judgment in the best interest of the corporation"), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 999 (1981).
11 ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1982).
62 Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, supra note 2, at 1745; see, e.g., Morrissey v.
Curran, 650 F.2d 1267, 1274 (2d Cir. 1981) (business judgment rule does not apply to situa-
tions involving self-dealing or conflict of interest on part of directors); Lewis v. S. L. & E.,
Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1980) (business judgment rule "presupposes" that directors
have no conflict of interest); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 631-32, 393 N.E.2d 994,
1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 927 (1979) (rule "shields" corporate directors only if they possess
disinterested independence).
03 See Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); Klaus v. Hi-Shear
Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 233 (9th Cir. 1975); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375, at 92,284 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Limmer v.
Medallion Group, Inc., 75 App. Div. 2d 299, 303, 428 N.Y.S.2d 961, 963 (1st Dep't 1980).
Courts disagree on the quantum of evidence a plaintiff must present to shift the burden of
proof to the director. Compare Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980)
("[business judgment] rule is rebutted only where a director's sole or primary purpose for
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The majority of courts that have addressed the issue have held
that actions taken to defeat a takeover attempt should be subject
to the same presumption of reasonableness that applies to other
corporate actions. 4 However, it has been argued that the business
judgment rule should not apply in such a context6 5 because corpo-
rate takeover attempts almost always threaten the existing corpo-
rate management.6 6
As long as directors are not "afflicted" with conflicts of inter-
adopting a course of action or refusing to adopt another is to retain control"), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 999 (1981) with Treadway Cos., 638 F.2d at 382 ("[o]nce a plaintiff demonstrates
that a director had an interest in the transaction at issue, the burden shifts to the director
to prove that the transaction was fair and reasonable to the corporation").
11 Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 741 F.2d 1555, 1560 (9th Cir.
1984); Siegel, supra note 58, at 384; see, e.g., Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d
707, 712, 718 (5th Cir. 1984) (rule applied to sale of discounted subordinated debentures
accompanied by "springing warrants" authorizing purchase of target shares at low price if
hostile tender offer occurred); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir.)
(rule applied when directors made defensive acquisitions to defeat tender offer), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 701 (2d Cir.
1980) (rule applied when directors allegedly had agreed to exchange offer to defeat tender
offer); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 288-89, 292 (3d Cir. 1980) (rule applied when
director-defendants rejected financially-beneficial proposals that would have required
change of control), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
5 See, e.g., Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Responses, supra note 2, at 1408 (entire
takeover process is being examined, both from offensive and defensive standpoints); Siegel,
supra note 58, at 408-11 (suggesting that states should enact legislation requiring share-
holder approval of target management defensive tactics); Sommer, The Norlin Case and
Business Judgment Rule, 17 REV. SEc. REG. 799, 803 (1984) (quoting John H. Huber, Direc-
tor of SEC Division of Corporate Finance) (burden of proof in contested tender offer should
be on directors to justify their actions); supra note 2 (discussing contentions that business
judgment rule should not apply in hostile takeover context). Legislative reforms of per-
ceived abuses in the area of tender offer defenses appear to be imminent. Representative
Timothy Wirth has suggested several reforms, including a bill "[t]o permit shareholders and
the [SEC] to seek injunctive relief from harmful defensive tactics by management in corpo-
rate takeover situations," which would require target management to establish that the de-
fensive tactic "is both prudent for the [target] and fair to the [target's] shareholders." H.R.
5695, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); see also S. 2777, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (similar
measure altering business judgment rule). The House Energy and Commerce Committee has
approved many of Representaive Wirth's reforms. See H.R. REP. No. 1028, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. 1028]; see also H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984) (forbidding, inter alia, certain self-tender offers and issuances of additional stock
during tender offer). The Committee, however, concluded that "if the courts in their inter-
pretation of the business judgment rule show increased judicial sensitivity to the conflicts of
interest in takeover situations, additional Federal protection along these lines may not be
necessary." H.R. REP. 1028, supra, at 15-16 (citing Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744
F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984) as an encouraging judicial dismissal of "rote application of the busi-
ness judgment rule"). For further discussion of SEC and congressional initiatives in the
tender offer arena, see Lipton & Brownstein, supra note 2, at 1426-29.
66 See supra note 2.
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est, their actions should not be subject to judicial scrutiny because
the expertise of the directors is likely to be greater than that of the
courts.67 It is submitted, however, that application of the business
judgment rule is also appropriate to some decisions made to de-
fend against a takeover attempt. In light of the increased potential
for conflicts of interest in hostile takeovers, it is suggested that the
burden of proving the reasonableness of defensive tactics should
shift once it appears that the corporate directors are at all con-
cerned with retaining control.6 8
Recently, in Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc.,69 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit examined the propriety of the issu-
ance of shares to a wholly-owned subsidiary and to a newly-created
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP)70 in the face of a potential
takeover attempt 7' and affirmed an injunction preventing the di-
'7 Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 300 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, J., con-
curring and dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); see also supra note 59 (policies
supporting business judgment rule); cf. Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977)
("management has not only the right but the duty to resist by all lawful means persons
whose attempts to win control of the corporation, if successful, would harm the corporate
enterprise"). But cf. Siegel, supra note 58, at 393-94 (questioning assumption that manage-
ment has right to take corporate action in response to tender offer). The business judgment
rule "was intended to prevent courts from second-guessing the judgment of those vested
with the managerial responsibility of corporations, in order to avoid imposing upon directors
who acted in good faith disastrous liability for simple mistakes, which would clearly discour-
age all but the judgment-proof from serving on boards." Sommer, supra note 65, at 799; see
Harrington, supra note 2, at 1021; Siegel, supra note 58, at 380; see also Easterbrook &
Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 2, at 1196 ("[tlhere is no reason to think that courts
generally could improve the performance of managers"); Gilson, supra note 2, at 823
(broader judicial role in evaluating actions of managment is difficult to justify); supra note
59.
08 Cf. Harrington, supra note 2, at 1021. Professor Harrington posits that "[d]is-
interestedness-the requirement that the duty of loyalty first be discharged and that the
decision-maker be free of the taint of conflicting interest-is a condition precedent to the
business judgment rule's application." Id.; see supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
In Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit ap-
peared to shift the burden of proof once an interest in retaining control was demonstrated.
See id. at 382. The court stated:
In nearly all of the cases treating stock transactions intended to affect control, the
directors who approved the transaction have had a real and obvious interest in it:
their interest in retaining or strengthening their control of the corporation. It is
this interest which causes the burden of proof to be shifted to the directors, to
demonstrate the propriety of the transaction.
Id. But see infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (Second Circuit subsequently held that
burden does not shift solely because directors are to remain in control if defensive tactic
succeeds).
", 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
70 See supra note 6 (discussion of ESOPs).
7' See 744 F.2d at 258. On January 6 and 12, 1984, Piezo Electric Products, Inc., in
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rectors from voting those shares.72 The court rejected the directors'
argument that the transfers of the newly issued shares were within
the discretion of the corporate directors once they had determined
that the takeover was not in the company's best interest.73 Judge
Kaufman, writing for the court, determined that although the busi-
ness judgment rule affords directors "wide latitude in devising
strategies to resist unfriendly advances, 74 the evidence constituted
a prima facie showing of self-interest on the part of the board and
shifted the burden of proof to the directors.75 The court noted that
"[w]hen an ESOP is set up in the context of a contest for control
. . . it devolves upon the board to show that the plan was in fact
created to benefit the employees, and not simply to further the aim
of managerial entrenchment. ' 76 The Norlin directors failed to
prove that the transaction was fair and reasonable, leading the
court to find that the ESOP was created solely as a tool for man-
conjunction with Rooney, Pace Inc., an investment banking firm, purchased approximately
32% of Norlin's common stock in several separate transactions. Id. at 259. Alleging various
violations of the federal securities laws, Norlin sought to enjoin Piezo from acquiring any
additional Norlin stock, to force divestitures of stock already purchased, and to bar voting
of Norlin stock owned by Piezo. Id. Immediately after Norlin's motions for a temporary
restraining order and expedited discovery were denied, Norlin's board transferred 28,395
shares to a wholly-owned subsidiary, purportedly in consideration of the subsidiary's cancel-
lation of a Norlin promissory note. Id. Five days later, the Norlin ESOP was created and
185,000 common shares were transferred to it in return for a promissory note. Id. Three
Norlin board members were appointed as trustees. Id. The Norlin board also transferred an
additional 800,000 shares to the subsidiary in return for an interest-bearing note. Id.
Norlin acknowledged in its filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission that it
would be the beneficial owner of all the transferred shares. Id. The Norlin directors' control
of the company's outstanding stock eventually reached 49%. Id.
72 See id. at 269.
" See id. at 265-66; see also Lipton, Takeover Bids, supra note 2, at 130 (discussing
bounds within which directors may respond to potential takeover bids); Lipton, Update,
supra note 2, at 1017 ("once the board of directors has in good faith and on a reasonable
basis determined to reject a takeover bid, the target may take any reasonable action to
accomplish this purpose") (emphasis added).
7' 744 F.2d at 264. Although directors are required to investigate all possible threats to
the company and must act in the best interests of the shareholders, they must demonstrate
that their actions are fair and reasonable to satisfy their duty of loyalty. Id.
76 Id. at 265. In concluding that the evidence constituted a prima facie showing of self-
interest, the Norlin court noted the following factors: all the newly-transferred shares were
to be voted by the Norlin directors; the shares were issued almost immediately after Nor-
lin's motion for a preliminary injunction was denied; the ESOP was created the same day
that the stock was issued to it; and the only rationale the board offered to the shareholders
for the transactions was its decision to oppose the takeover "at all costs." See id. These
factors created a "strong inference" that the transactions were designed to solidify manage-
ment control rather than to benefit the employees. Id.
76 Id. at 266.
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agement self-perpetuation."
Consistent with prior Second Circuit decisions, 7  the Norlin
court clearly limited application of the business judgment rule by
shifting the burden of proof upon a prima facie showing of the
board's interest in the transaction.7 9 The earlier decisions, how-
ever, do not adequately define "interest" within the context of a
takeover contest."' It is submitted, therefore, that the Second Cir-
cuit in Norlin should have clearly defined the "interest" required
to shift the burden of proof under the business judgment rule in
such a situation.
The Norlin court relied on two earlier decisions in which the
Second Circuit had examined actions taken to defend against a
hostile takeover.81 In Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp.,8 2 the directors
of Treadway Companies, Inc. (Treadway), to avoid a possible take-
over by Care Corporation (Care), entered into negotiations with a
third company, Fair Lanes, Inc. (Fair Lanes), regarding a possible
business combination.8 Pursuant to those negotiations, Treadway
issued a block of shares to Fair Lanes sufficient to reduce Care's
7 See id. at 266.
78 See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Co., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) (burden shifts
once plaintiff demonstrates that director had interest in transaction); Crouse-Hinds Co. v.
InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Treadway, 638 F.2d at 382);
Lewis v. S. L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[w]hen a shareholder attacks a
transaction in which the directors have an interest other than as directors of the corpora-
tion, the directors may not escape review of the merits of the transaction").
7' See 744 F.2d at 265; supra note 75 and accompanying text.
80 See Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702-03 (2d Cir. 1980) (bur-
den does not shift merely because directors are to remain in control), rev'g 518 F. Supp. 390,
410 (N.D.N.Y.) (board is "interested" and burden shifts if successful defensive tactics will
enable them to retain control). In Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980),
the court stated that:
In nearly all of the cases treating stock transactions intended to affect control,
the directors who approved the transaction have had a real and obvious interest in
it- their interest in retaining or strengthening their control of the corporation. It is
this interest which causes the burden of proof to be shifted to the directors ....
Id. at 382. In Crouse-Hinds, however, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit appeared
to reject its reasoning in Treadway. See 634 F.2d at 702. But see infra note 94 (distinguish-
ing Crouse-Hinds).
"I See 744 F.2d at 264-65 (discussing Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d
Cir. 1980), and Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980)).
82 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980).
83 Id. at 365-66. In late August of 1979, the directors of Treadway received Care's sixth
Schedule 13D amendment, which revealed that Care held 27.1% of Treadway's stock. Id. at
365. On September 4, the chairman of Treadway first contacted Fair Lanes, explaining that
"Treadway was exploring ways of staving off a takeover by Care." Id. In early October, Fair
Lanes raised the possibility of a Treadway-Fair Lanes combination. Id. at 366.
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interest in Treadway to less than the number of shares needed to
block a merger.84 Applying the business judgment rule, the court
held that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the directors had acted in bad faith or in furtherance of their own
interests to shift to the directors the burden of proving that the
transaction was fair and reasonable.85 Noting that the majority of
the Treadway directors were to lose their positions if the merger
with Fair Lanes took place,8 the court held that there had been no
showing that the directors' actions were motivated by self-
interest.8 7
Distinguishing the facts before it from those of Treadway, the
district court in Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc.", granted a
tender offeror a preliminary injunction barring a target company
from transferring a block of shares pursuant to a merger with a
third company. 89 The court concluded that the directors had an
interest in the transaction, noting that they were to retain control
of the company after the merger.90 Thus, the court held that the
burden of proof shifted and that the directors had failed to estab-
lish the fairness of their actions.9 1
84 Id. at 370. Fair Lanes had requested the sale, viewing it as "a necessary first step in
its dealings with Treadway." Id. at 366. As a result of the stock issuance, Care's interest was
reduced from 34% to 28%. Id. at 370.
85 See id. at 382.
86 See id. at 383. The district court found that all of the directors except one expected
to lose their positions if the proposed defensive combination with Fair Lanes succeeded. Id.
This expectation was reasonable because during negotiations, Fair Lanes had asked that it
be allowed to name a majority of the Treadway directors immediately. Id.
11 See id. The court noted that "the consummation of the proposed business combina-
tion could not be expected to perpetuate control by [the] directors" and, therefore, con-
cluded that Care had not demonstrated an interest on the part of the Treadway directors
sufficient to shift the burden of proof. Id.
" 518 F. Supp. 390 (N.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980).
89 See id. at 413. The target company, Crouse-Hinds Co., negotiated an exchange offer
with a third party, Belden Corp., after InterNorth, Inc. announced a tender offer for control
of Crouse-Hinds. Id. at 394. The exchange offer was designed to protect a previously negoti-
ated defensive merger between the two companies intended to block InterNorth's imminent
bid for control. Id. at 395-96.
1o See id. at 410. Upon determining that the Crouse-Hinds directors would retain con-
trol after the merger, the district court determined that "under the Treadway decision, it
cannot seriously be disputed that InterNorth has met its threshold burden of proof with
respect to the interests of the board of directors." Id. Additional factors pointed to by the
court included: the haste in negotiating the merger once the tender offer had been an-
nounced; the assistance in obtaining shareholder approval provided by board maneuvering,
and the influence that the Chief Executive Officer of Crouse-Hinds may have exerted to
head off a fair consideration of the tender offer. See id. at 411-12.
91 See id.
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
versed the decision of the district court,92 stating that the district
court had erroneously extended Treadway by inferring that "if the
directors are to remain on the board after the merger, perpetuation
of their control must be presumed to be their motivation." 93 The
court concluded, therefore, that the burden of proof had been im-
properly shifted, and that the tender offeror had failed to present
sufficient evidence to support an injunctive order.9 4
Although the holding in Treadway did not compel the conclu-
sion reached by the district court in Crouse-Hinds,95 it is suggested
that directors who are to remain in control should be considered
"interested" for purposes of shifting the burden of proof under the
business judgment rule.9 In such situations, shifting the burden of
92 Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 692, 704 (2d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 702 (emphasis in original); see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
See 634 F.2d at 692, 704. It is submitted that Crouse-Hinds is distinguishable from
most cases involving defenses to takeover attempts since the disputed transfer of stock was
designed not only to defend against a hostile tender offer, but was also to occur as part of a
merger agreement announced prior to the tender offer. See id. at 703; Brodskey, Hostile
Takeovers in IX SEC '81 153, 156-57 (H. Schlagman & N. Hirsch eds. 1981). Brodskey sug-
gests that the result in Crouse-Hinds may have been different if the merger had been nego-
tiated after the tender offer or if the tender offer had not been conditioned on the termina-
tion of the merger agreement. See Brodskey, supra, at 156-57; see also Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 301 n.6 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, J., concurring and dissenting)
("[t]he facts in Crouse-Hinds are complicated and special"). In Panter, Judge Cudahy de-
termined that even though the Crouse-Hinds directors were allegedly "interested" in the
merger because they would remain in control after its consummation, the Court of Appeals
declined to shift the burden of proof for the reasons suggested by Brodskey. See 646 F.2d at
301 n.6 (Cudahy, J., concurring and dissenting). Since the tender offeror had indicated no
interest in the target at the time the Crouse-Hinds-Belden merger was negotiated, the direc-
tors could not have been motivated by a desire to retain control. Id. at 302 (Cudahy, J.,
concurring and dissenting); see Crouse-Hinds, 634 F.2d at 703. Furthermore, because the
tender offer was conditioned on abandonment of the merger, the directors' alleged desire to
facilitate the merger was "entirely credible." Panter, 646 F.2d at 302 (Cudahy, J., concur-
ring and dissenting); see Crouse-Hinds, 634 F.2d at 703.
It is submitted, therefore, that Crouse-Hinds actually turns on the determination that
the defendant-directors had effectively demonstrated the reasonableness of the stock ex-
change and not on the plaintiff's failure to prove that the directors were "interested." In
other words, it is suggested that the plaintiff in Crouse-Hinds failed to rebut the defen-
dants' proof that their actions were reasonable and fair.
"' See Crouse-Hinds, 634 F.2d at 702. The Second Circuit noted that the district
court's inference (i.e. that if directors are to remain on the board after the proposed merger,
perpetuation of their control must be presumed to be their motivation,) had "no basis in
either law or logic." Id. The court explained that "[t]he proposition that 'A implies B' is not
the equivalent of 'non-A implies non-B,' and neither proposition follows logically from the
other." Id. at 702 n.20.
"Shifting the burden of proof once it is demonstrated that the board of directors will
remain in control if the defensive maneuver succeeds will simplify the determination of
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proof is consistent with the presumption of disinterested expertise
underlying the business judgment rule. As one commentator has
noted, "the evidence is overwhelming that ... directors must nec-
essarily find it exceedingly difficult to act independently in a take-
over contest where the incumbent managers to whom they are be-
holden for their status are to lose both control of the corporation
and likely their jobs as well."98
CONCLUSION
The Leigh and Bierwirth cases demonstrate the difficulty
courts are experiencing in delineating clear guidelines for the
proper use of employee benefit plans in takeover attempts under
ERISA. Similarly, the uncertainty surrounding allocation of the
burden of proof under the business judgment rule vitiates the im-
pact of precedent for setting the parameters of permissible con-
duct. Since the use of ESOPs and other EBPs in the takeover
arena can be expected to increase, clear guidelines are essential for
corporate directors and trustees who desire to act in the best inter-
ests of their companies and beneficiaries, as well as for the courts,
which ultimately will be required to settle disputes arising in con-
tests for corporate control. Logically, the standards governing ex-
isting and newly created EBPs should parallel one another as
closely as the existing statutory and case law will allow.
It is submitted that disallowing the defensive use of EBPs in
corporate takeovers by prohibiting defensive tactics altogether or
whether the directors were "interested." See Brodskey, supra note 94, at 154; Harrington,
supra note 2, at 1021-23. It should not be difficult for the board to prove the existence of a
legitimate business reason indicating why a takeover is undesirable. See Siegel, supra note
58, at 386. Norlin, in fact, suggests that the burden shifts when directors are to remain in
control. See 744 F.2d at 266 (when ESOP is created "in the context of a contest for [corpo-
rate] control," directors must demonstrate that plan is designed to benefit employees). Nev-
ertheless, the court based its holding on other evidence deemed sufficient to demonstrate
the board's self-interest. See id. One commentary has noted:
Norlin may be interpreted to stand for the proposition that, at least in the Second
Circuit, the actions of a takeover target's board of directors in issuing new shares,
which issuance results in the board's effectively assuring its own voting control,
will not normally be entitled to the broad protection of the business judgment
rule .... Read most broadly, it may mark the beginning of judicial intolerance of
the deference given the decisions of target management, particularly when ex-
treme defensive tactics are involved. On the other hand, Norlin was an extreme
case, and may be narrowly read and limited to its facts.
Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Responses, supra note 2, at 1406-07.
9 See supra note 68.
Harrington, supra note 2, at 1021-22.
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by extending the application of the prohibited transaction rules of
ERISA would constitute an unwarranted overreaction. It is sug-
gested that adequate protection for participants in employee bene-
fit plans is ensured by section 404 of ERISA and the fiduciary
principles that will govern once the burden of proof under the bus-
iness judgment rule is shifted to an officer who is to remain in con-
trol. Extending the Leigh interpretation of section 406 to preclude
a defensive purchase of employer stock during a hostile takeover
attempt or barring all defensive tactics would unduly inhibit cor-
porate fiduciaries in their attempts to act in the best interests of
the plans they represent.
Melany R. Gray
